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On August 1, 1986, during a period of critically high water levels on most of the Great
Lakes, the Governments of the United States and Canada requested by Reference to the International
Joint Commission (Commission) an examination and report on methods of alleviating the adverse
consequences of ﬂuctuating water levels in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin.
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this report is to respond to that part of the Reference calling for: “...an
interim report, focusing on measures to alleviate the present crisis, be submitted no later than one year
from the date the Commission’s study board actively begins its work.” and, in a limited way, to the
requirement to; “...propose and evaluate measures which governments could take, under crisis condi-
tions, to alleviate problems created by high and low lake levels...”. This report is submitted in a
situation changed considerably from that prevailing at the time of the request as the extremely high
lake levels of 1985 and 1986 have abated substantially.
The Task Force Investigation
Responses to the recent high water level crisis included the Reference from Govem-
ments to the DC and implementation of numerous domestic emergency programs in the various
jurisdictions. Some limited responses to modify the lake ﬂuctuations, using available regulatory and
diversion works, were also undertaken including: (a) the temporary storage of water on Lake Supe-
rior, (b) the implementation of Criterion (k) with respect to Lake Ontario regulation (both pursuant to
existing IJC Orders of Approval), and (c) temporary storage of the Ogoki diversion by the Province of
Ontario.
The Commission submitted an initial report to Governments by letters dated November
14 and December 10, 1986. Concurrently, the Commission decided to obtain additional technical
information on all possible crisis measures, using a Task Force composed of IJC staff and specialists
from both countries.
Within the one year study time frame established by the Commission, the Task Force
identiﬁed measures which could be implemented within approximately one year or less to alleviate
the crisis. The Commission determined that a satisfactory economic and social analyses could not be
undertaken in the available time and should not be attempted. However, signiﬁcant physical effects
were to be identified and direct project costs estimated wherever possible.
Eight major tasks were identiﬁed and sub- groups established to develop detailed work
plans and undertake the technical evaluations. Complete descriptions of the various measures, with
their limitations and constraints, appear in the individual task reports that have been made available
previously and are summarized in Appendix A. Following completion of the initial work assigmnent,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 
to their full capabilities for various reasons. First, implementation of certain measures would
reduce income or increase costs to various entities and no entity was eager to be the only one
making that sacriﬁce. Second, the reduction in levels achieved by any oneavailable measure
was considered by some to be minor when compared to the larger impacts of nature in the form
of supplies and the direction and intensity of winds. Third, there was concern regarding the
absence of clear means and lead time to deal with any adverse effects. Fourth and of primary
importance, each measure has both domestic and international implications and there was no
agreement or common understanding among the various Governments and interests on what
should be done.
 
The Task Force found that a combination of relatively low capital cost measures, utilizing
primarily existing facilities and operated as part of a Great Lakes Basin emergency high water
management plan, could be implemented within one year and could lower extreme high water
levels. The Task Force also found that both structural and non-structural coastal zone manage-
ment techniques can reduce the adverse effects of high water levels, and should be integrated
appropriately into an emergency management plan.
The implementation of an emergency high-water or low-water management plan requires
agreements between the Governments, and coordination among the various entities that have
the operational responsibility for each individual component.
 III Recommendations
In recognition of the recent high—level crisis, the abrupt reversal of precipitation and the
ﬁndings of the Task Force, the Commission believes it is prudent to offer further advice and recom-
mendations to Governments at this time.
Recommendation I.
Governments should initiate immediately broad but systematic
discussions of their use of Great Lakes water, as calledfor in the
Commission's January 1985 report on Great Lakes Diversions and
Consumptive Uses.
In reiterating this advice, the Commission’s intent is to initiate discussions on the broad
and fundamental issues that bear directly or indirectly on measures Governments could take under low
or high water crisis conditions. Our work under the 1986 Reference to date has revealed a number of
issues, on which there are undoubtedly strongly held but differing views by Governments and inter-
ests, and which may signiﬁcantly and perhaps profoundly affect our two countries and the preservation
and utilization of the Basin.
For example:
° There are differences of opinion regarding the preference for structural versus non-
structural solutions to high water levels.
° The recent Water Policy issued by the Federal Government in Canada encourages
hydroelectric power development consistent with environmental protection. Conse-
quently any potential action that would reduce hydropower generation, such as a
diversion from the basin, may be viewed differently on the Canadian side of the basin
than in the United States.
° A technical problem linked to policy matters is the uncertainty of forecasting future
lake supplies and resulting levels. This particular uncertainty is compounded by the
“greenhouse” potential. The lack of precision on this point becomes a policy issue
because it contains the risk that any degree of protection provided from either extreme
high or low levels will be exceeded or, conversely, never fully utilized. The amount of
risk acceptable will, in all likelihood, vary signiﬁcantly among decision makers.
° Federal/non—Federal cost-sharing has always been subject to debate and changes in
policy. In the case of the Great Lakes, there is the added complexity of two sovereign
nations with quite different divisions ofpowers with their provinces and states. In
addition, the Commission anticipates that closely tied to possible cost sharing concerns
will be issues of distribution of beneﬁts, the impacts and distribution and redistribution
of disbeneﬁts, and the applicability of remedial, mitigation or compensatory measures.
 
  
Further, the Commission believes that these issues are so fundamental to the conduct of
its ongoing, comprehensive study under the Reference, that consultations on both sides of the border
regarding those differences and views should begin now and provision made for the results of these
consultations to be taken into account in the actual study process itself.
Recommendation 2.
As part of their consultations on this report, Governments
should develop coordinated, emergency management plans for
both high and low water conditions, beginning with the
information provided in our initial report (letters of
November 14 and December 10, 1986) and the ﬁndings of the
Task Force.
This recommendation responds to several important concerns.
First, the 1985-86 record high-water levels caused or contributed to extensive property
damages and erosion in both the United States and Canada. In examining this crisis, the Task Force
found a number of measures that are technically possible, using primarily existing facilities, to modify
high water levels although some measures may have adverse effects. Such measures are summarized
in Table 1.
Second, given the complexity of the issues, Governments and interests involved, a con-
siderable amount of time will be necessary following completion of the Commission’s comprehensive
study, to reach international and domestic agreements, obtain requisite funding, and implement any
additional comprehensive measures aimed at alleviating the adverse effects of both high and low water
levels. In the interim, the present trend in precipitation could reverse and high-water levels and
attendant damages recur. Finding that greater relief from extreme high water levels could be achieved
for certain interests with improved cooperation among the various affected interests acting in a system
context, the Commission believes that Governments should begin at this time to prepare for and coor-
dinate an interim emergency management response.
 Table 2
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status; or allowing adverse effects to fall naturally where they may.
  
Recommendation 3.
All levels of government in Canada and the United States act to ﬁtrther discourage the
construction ofnew, damage-prone buildings or facilities on the Great Lakes shoreline pending
completion of the comprehensive study.
Given that the recurrence of high water levels is unavoidable, one method of reducing
the potential for future damages is to restrict the use of land in the ﬂood plain. Although this is a
measure under investigation as part of the Commission’s comprehensive study, the Commission
believes that the interim implementation of this recommendation is appropriate so as not to preclude
effective future Commission recommendations and Government action. If water levels continue to
recede, development will normally continue to encroach upon the ﬂood plain, thus increasingthe
potential severity of damages caused by future ﬂooding. For those ﬂood plains already developed,
there is of course a more difﬁcult question ofprotection versus prevention, which is being addressed
as part of the comprehensive study. But for undeveloped areas, it should be ensured that this land,
whether private or public, remains free of damage-prone structures.
Recommendation 4.
Governments enact measures necessary to insure that further encroachment does not
occur in the connecting channels ofthe Great Lakes.
Technical studies have shown that various landﬁlls have been placed in the connecting
channels over time and that they have, depending on location, small but incremental effects on river
ﬂows and Great Lakes water levels. This issue of existing and future landﬁlls in the Niagara River is
of particular concern. The Task Force identiﬁed a number of obstructions in the Niagara River and
estimated that the cumulative effect on Lake Erie water levels is significant. Because of the hydrau-
lic characteristics of the Upper Niagara River, removal and/or modiﬁcation of some of the existing
obstructions, particularly those in the vicinity of the Peace Bridge, should also be considered.
Recommendation 5.
Governments continue the public information and technical activities emphasized
during the recent high water crisis pending completion ofthe comprehensive study.
As Governments are well aware, there is considerable demand for information during
periods of extreme water levels. The Commission continues to ﬁnd signiﬁcant groups of the public
that have the need and desire to be better infomed concerning the hydraulic, economic, social and
biological features and interrelationships in the Basin. The recent high level crisis, and the strong
responses by Governments and others in providing information and technical and ﬁnancial assis-
tance, has increased awareness of ﬂuctuating lake levels and their consequences. But the Commis-
sion stresses that at least during the period of our comprehensive study, programs should be continu-
ing in nature and not just at times of unusual conditions. Particular emphasis should be placed on
those activities having a positive effect such as coastal zone hazard mapping. Such information must
be “accessible”, so that it is understandable by all interests and allows them to make full use of the
information provided.
Appendix A
Summary, Great Lakes Water Levels Task Force


























































The Great Lakes Water Levels Task Force undertook a
limited, emergency, flood control study. It did not include
storm conditions or erosion control; nor were economic, social
or environmental analyses undertaken. However it did identify
crisis measures, address their technical feasibility, quantify
hydrologic impacts and, where possible, indicate significant
physical effects; all of which can provide an improved basis
for decision making by Governments and the general public.
The Task Force was requested to examine every measure
that could theoretically reduce extreme high water levels. No
measure was excluded just because it might be trivial or
impractical. In some cases, measures were taken to their
physical limits in order to test their theoretical maximum
effects. For example, the maximum physical flow through the
Welland Canal of about 12,000 cfs (340 cms) was examined even
though this flow requires the cessation of navigation.
The effects of any measure depends not only on its
size but also on how it is used (when started and stopped and,
where possible, its operation), and the water supplies with
which it must attempt to cope.
The Task Force chose several different water supply
conditions to test the various emergency measures within each
Task. In Task 8, Systemic Effects, all measures were subjected
to the same water supplies, i.e., the actual high supplies of
1985 and 1986 followed by three years of average supplies.
Also, each measure was assumed to be in place and its operation
was begun immediately, since it was known that two years of
high supplies were coming.
In the real world, no one knows what future supplies
will occur. Consequently, it is unlikely that all measures
would or should be initiated at the same time and the effects
reported herein likely overstate what could be achieved in
reality. Conversely, it is possible future supplies may be
even more severe than the extreme supplies used in the Task
Force analyses, in which case the effects may be understated.
It is important to recognize that the Task Force
reports and summary do not include a discussion of the many
positive effects that would result from reducing extreme high
lake levels. These effects would include but are not limited
to: reduced flooding, erosion and pumping costs; improved storm
drainage, sewage treatment plant operation and recreational
opportunities; possible environmental protection; and they
would occur alongthe entire shoreline of every lake. However,
  
  
there is not sufficient information available to make even
qualitative estimates of these effects, and the resources
required for such an effort were beyond the scope of the Task
Force.
Similarly, no attempt was made to quantify those
interests that can better utilize high levels.
On the other
hand, the measures themselves are more site specific, several
have been studied previously, and qualitative estimates of
physical impacts were possible in almost all cases.
These have
been included.










On August 1, 1986 the Governments of Canada and the
United States, in response to record high water level
conditions occurring in the Great Lakes, referred the problem
of fluctuating Great Lakes water levels to the International
Joint Commission for examination and report. As part of this
effort, the Governments asked for an interim report focusing on
measures to alleviate the high water level crisis existing at
that time. To obtain the additional information for its
consideration of an interim report, the Commission decided in
September 1986 to use a Task Force approach with membership
composed of IJC staff and specialists from both countries.
This document is a summary of the investigations and findings
of the Task Force.
Background
The Great Lakes and their connecting waterways make up
the largest freshwater system in the world. Great Lakes water
levels are a dynamic phenomenon; fluctuations in lake levels
may occur short term, seasonally or long term. The total water
supplies are the dominant cause of these fluctuations. Because
of their vast surface area and restrictive connecting channels,
it is usually possible for the system to cope with typical
water supply variations in any given year with a normal range
of levels of one to two feet (0.3 to 0.6 m). While nature
plays the predominant role in these fluctuations, the influence
of human impacts becomes more of a concern when water levels
are either at the extreme high or low part of their cycle.
During 1985 and 1986 monthly water levels on all of
the Great Lakes, except Lake Ontario, were in most cases the
highest in this century. Predictions for continued highwater
levels, including Lake Ontario, were not encouraging. There
was considerable shoreline flooding, erosion and associated
coastal zone problems, with resulting public demands for
Government action. It could be said that only the unusually
small number of severe storms kept damages lower than
anticipated.
An initial IJC response to the Reference was submitted
to Governments by letters dated November 14, and December 10,
1986. In that report the Commission outlined; actions it had
taken, actions recommended be taken by Governments, and
measures to lower water levels which were technically feasible
utilizing existing facilities which mightbe implemented
immediately. At that time, water levels were extremely high
throughout the Basin and the Commission had initiated
additional investigations through the Task Force approach.





























































































occurred because of record lgw supplies to the Lakes between
late 1986 and mid-1987; the exact opposite of what occurred in
1985 and 1986.
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of the Task Force investigation was to
provide the Commission with technical information on possible
"crisis" action measures. Because in late 1986 no one could
predict when the crisis conditions would end, it was decided
that all possible measures should be considered which:
1) could possibly be taken to alleviate problems
created by current (ie - 1986) high lake levels;
2) could be examined within the one year; and
3) could be implemented within approximately one
year or less after reporting to Governments.
The Commission decided that a detailed, conventional
benefit/cost analysis should not be undertaken for this
effort. However significant physical effects were to be
identified and direct project costs estimated wherever possible.
A preliminary scoping of potential measures and tasks
was drafted in September, and reviewed and finalized in
December 1986. Eight major tasks were identified and staffed
to develop detailed work plans and undertake the technical
evaluations of potential measures within each task. Measures
initially reviewed, and eliminated from detailed examination
due to lack of effectiveness or the one year timeframe
requirement, included:






other emergency high water level actions (e.g.
Great Salt Lake pumping).
Hydrologic impacts (water levels and outflows) of the
various measures consisted of comparing the "no action" (or a














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Co-Chair Tasks 2, 4
Water Management Branch





























































Member Tasks 5, 8
Minnesota Dept. of Natural
























Member Tasks 1, 5, 7
Inland Waters/Lands
Member Tasks 3, 8






Member Tasks 1, 4, 5
Great Lakes Environmental
Research Laboratory, National
Ocean and Atmospheric Administration
Ogbazghi (Obie) Sium
Member Tasks 1, 7
Minnesota Dept. of Natural
Resources
Ronald Wilshaw
Co—chair Tasks 1, 5, 6
Detroit District
Member Task 8
U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers
   
  
POTENTIAL MEASURES AND FINDINGS
The Task Force met on several occasions to organize
the various tasks and develop detailed work statements,
including personnel and schedules. Table 2 lists the eight
tasks and indicates the focus of investigation and objectives
for each.
Task 1 - Lake Superior Storage
The work of this task was divided into two areas. The
first part addressed the technical feasibility of increasing
the storage on Lake Superior above 602 feet (183.5 m) and the
associated physical impacts; the second phase reviewed historic
information on lake levels, datum planes and outflow
relationships to identify the maximum historic Lake Superior
water level.
An evaluation of the stability of the regulatory works
and structures located in the St. Marys
Riverat Sault Ste.
Marie,
Ontario/Michigan was carried out to determine if the
works could accommodate an increased water level.
While the
different structures would be over—topped at various stages,
it
appears that all the structures can accommodate a water level
of about 602.8
feet
(183.7 m) measured at the compensating
works,




No further raising of the Lake Superior water level
is possible without considerable stability analysis to identify
any necessary modifications.
Any storing of water
would































































































































































To determine if it is technically possible to raise
Lake Superior above 602.0 feet (182.5 m), and
identify the significant physical impacts both on
Lake Superior and downstream, and any mitigation
measures that may be required. To examine historic
Lake Superior water levels.
To determine if it is technically possible to lower
Lake Ontario levels by removing or modifying some
of the existing constraints on Lake Ontario
outflows and identify the significant physical
impacts.
To determine if it is technically possible to lower
lake levels through changes in existing diversion
rates and identify the significant physical
impacts. The diversions were the Welland Canal,
the Long Lac and Ogoki diversions, the Chicago
diversion, and the New York State Barge Canal.
To determine if it is technically possible to
increase Lake Erie outflows by variousmeasures and
identify the significant physical impacts. The
measures involved the Black Rock Lock, the
Chippawa-Grass Island Pool, channel excavation at
the head of the Niagara River, and removing or
modifying obstructions in the Niagara River and a
Squaw Island diversion.
To determine if it is technically possible to modify
flows in the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers and










To determine if it is technically possible to
improve flows under the ice cover in the connecting
channels and identify the significant physical
impacts.
To assemble available information on coastal
emergency activities including; measures, public
information, forecasting, mapping and damage
resulting from the present crisis.
To evaluate the systemic effect of
various combinations of emergency measures examined
by the other tasks.
-10..
The review of historic water level data showed that
high levels occurred on Lake Superior in 1869 and 1876. The
task found that the maximum historic level on Lake Superior
likely occurred in August 1876. When converted to the present
Great Lakes datum, IGLD (1955), using the procedure presently
accepted by the Commission, this level becomes 602.31 feet
(183.6 m).
Task 2 - Lake Ontario/St. Lawrence River
This task evaluated the technical feasibility of
lowering Lake Ontario levels by removing or modifying some of
the existing constraints on Lake Ontario outflows, the
objective being to increase outflows thereby lowering Lake
Ontario water levels during crisis conditions.
Four constraints were identified for detailed study:
(i) agricultural land on the shoreline of Lake St. Peter
(Quebec);
(ii) residential, commercial and industrial lands
surrounding Lake St. Louis (Quebec);
(iii) navigation depth requirements in the International
Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River; and
(iv) maximum outflows during the navigation season.
(i) Adverse impacts on cropland surrounding Lake St.
Peter occur at levels in excess of 16.7 ft. (5.1 m) (IGLD 1955)
at the Sorel water level gauge during the growing season from
late May to the end of October. Computations showed that
flooding of these agricultural lands during 1986 could have
decreased Lake Ontario's level 0.62 ft. (19 cm) with this
amount being reduced to 0.33 ft. (10 cm) by the end of the
navigation season in December. A number of ways to mitigate
these impacts were described including construction of dykes,
dredging of the St. Lawrence River, purchasing flood easements,
or compensating farmers for damages. The first three probably
could not be implemented quickly.
(ii) Adverse impacts to residential, industrial and
commercial facilities occur around Lake St. Louis at levels in
excess of 72.25 ft. (22 m). To remove this constraint requires
protecting these lands and structures around Lake St. Louis by
major dredging and/or dyking. Since such measures could not be
completed within one year, it was determined that the Lake St.
Louis outflow constraint would remain.
(iii) Navigation depths in the International Rapids
Section of the St. Lawrence River are provided for in the
Commission's Orders of Approval concerning Lake Ontario







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 The Long Lac and 0goki diversions, bringing an average
annual












one representing a complete stoppage of both diversions,
while
the other scenario assumed the 0goki diversion was closed with
800 cfs
(23cms)
remaining in the Long Lac diversion to sustain
the pulp mill at Terrace Bay to avoid major adverse impact to
the town.
Depending on the supplies and the regulation
scenario, the ultimate effect, reached in about two years,
would be to reduce Lakes Michigan-Huron between 0.16 ft. to
0.23 ft. (5 to 7 cm), and Lake Erie between 0.12 ft. and 0.15
ft. (4 to 5 cm).
Physical impacts of altering these two diversions will
occur in both the Great Lakes and Hudson Bay drainage basins
from reductions in flows along the diversion routes and
increases in flows within the natural drainage area.
Shutdown
of the diversions causes reduction of electrical energy
production in the Ontario Hydro system with some additional
reduction at U.S. and Quebec hydro stations. Complete stoppage
of the Long Lac diversion itself would prevent normal log
driving operations, resulting in closure of the Terrace Bay
pulp mill and the direct loss of approximately 2,500 jobs in
the area as well as impact on the livelihood of approximately
7,500 people indirectly throughout a wider area.
There would
be a direct adverse impact on the fishing and recreation
industries of the area; certain fish spawning and wildlife
habitat areas would be disrupted and there would be increased
hazards to boaters on the rivers.
Flood flows could affect
Indian Reserve No. 65 at the confluence of the 0goki and Albany
Rivers.
The three components of the Chicago diversion
presently withdraw and divert a maximum of 3,200 cfs (90 cms)
from Lake Michigan, as decreed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
This
task examined the possibility of increasing the diversion rate
to a maximum annual diversion of 10,000 cfs (283 cms), a
potential maximum indicated in previous studies. Computer
simulations of lake levels with the diversion at the above two
rates indicate that levels on Lakes Michigan—Huron and Erie
could ultimately be reduced by 0.21 ft. (6 cm) and 0.14 ft.
(4 cm), respectively, within about two years.
Significant physical impacts to navigation, as well as
interests that could be flooded along the Illinois waterway,
are associated with a diversion increase to 10,000 cfs
(283 cms). An operating plan would need to be developed if
flow increases were contemplatedas an emergency measure.
-13—
 





















1985 and 1986 declined to an annual average of 7,900 cfs
(224 cms) due to repairs of a lock wall that failed in 1985 and
the beginning of a major seven-year canal rehabilitation
program. It has been estimated that the theoretical maximum
flow through the canal is 11,000 cfs (310 cms) with maximum
water use byall sectors. If a water level crisis of such
proportions existed that the canal was utilized solely to lower
Lake Erie and upstream water levels, all navigation could be
stopped and flows could possibly reach 12,000 cfs (340 cms).
Computer simulations comparinglake levels with this latter
extreme flow and the normal 9,200 cfs (260 cms) maximum showed
that Lakes Michigan—Huron would be reduced by 0.03 ft. (1 cm)
and Lake Erie by 0.11 ft. (3 cm) after about two years.
Theoretical maximum flows of 12,000 cfs (340 cms)
through the Welland Canal would have several significant
physical impacts. There would be complete cessation of
navigation between Lake Ontario and the upper Great Lakes for
the entire period affecting the economies of both countries.
In the canal itself, there is a risk of erosion and bank '
slumping at any flows in excess of 9,000 cfs (255 cms). The
maximum flow would also cause flooding around the pondage
basins and over the docks; and increase bank stabilization and
dredging maintenance.
This task also investigated the New York State Barge
Canal. The relatively small unregulated flow, estimated at 700
cfs (20 cms), is withdrawn from the Niagara River considerably
downstream from the natural outlet of Lake Erie. Also, the
Canal is virtually at capacity without extensive
modifications. Consequently, this diversion has virtually no
effect on the levels of the Great Lakes and the Niagara River
and cannot be used as a practical means to lower water levels
in an emergency.
Task 4 - Niagara River
This task investigated the following measures in the
Niagara River to increase Lake Erie outflows:
(i) increased flows through the Black Rock
, Lock;
(ii) modified operation of the
Chippawa-Grass Island Pool Control
Structure;


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the Niagara River. Because the investigation showed that
construction required at least two years, neither possibility
was considered practical as an emergency measure.
Task 5 - St. Clair/Detroit Rivers
The work of this task was divided into three areas:
the first area reviewed historic information to determine the
effect of the dredging and compensating works that have been
placed in the St. Clair/Detroit Rivers; the second area looked
at lowering Lakes Michigan-Huron by removing the compensating
works which have beenplaced over timein the Detroit River;
conversely, the third area looked at lowering Lake Erie by
placing additional works in the St. Clair River to offset the
effect of dredging in that river.
The task documents the various dredging projects in
the st. Clair/Detroit River system since 1876. The estimated
net effect of all dredging and compensating works placed to
date in the St. Clair River is a lowering of Lakes
Michigan-Huron between approximately 1.2 to 1.6 ft. (0.4 to
0.5 m). The effect of such works in the Detroit River on Lakes
Michigan-Huron and St. Clair is negligible.
Removal of the compensating dykes in the Detroit River
would lower Lakes Michigan—Huron by about 0.15 ft. (5 cm) and
Lake St. Clair by 0.10 ft. (3 cm). However the timeframe to
-16..
 accomplish this action would extend well beyond one year. Such
removal would restrict navigation in the river during
construction and may reduce navigation draft throughout the
system. There could be significant environmental impacts both
during the construction phase and in the longvterm.
Studies indicated it is technically possible to place
sills in the St. Clair River to offset the lowering of Lakes
Michigan-Huron caused by navigation dredging projects, and in
turn decrease inflows to Lake Erie. Such a project could raise
Lakes Michigan-Huron by 0.6 ft.(18 cm), have adverse impacts to
shoreline interests on those lakes, create transitory but
overall negative environmental impacts and have only a
transitory lowering of Lake Erie water levels. A staged
construction period could take from three to ten years to
complete.
Task 6 — Ice Management
This task investigated the technical feasibility of
improving flows under the ice covers in the connecting
channels. The review included an examination of the ice
formation and dissipation forces in the Great Lakes connecting
channels and the St. Lawrence River, current ice management
structures such as ice booms, and measures to improve flow
conditions during the ice season. Winter navigation and
documentation of the severe 1984 ice jam in the St. Clair River
were also reviewed.
The task noted that the present use of ice booms in
the St. Marys, Niagara and St. Lawrence Rivers has increased
winter outflows, reduced ice jamming and/or improved local
conditions. The task found that placement of an ice boom in
the St. Clair River should help prevent jams caused by the flow
of Lake Huron ice into the channel. Using a simplistic
assumption that such a measure would totally eliminate the
present average ice retardation in the river, there would be a
calculated maximum lowering effect on Lake Superior of 0.09 ft.
(3 cm) and on Lakes Michigan-Huron of 0.12 ft. (4 cm) while the
average level of Lake Erie would rise by 0.05 ft. (2 cm). The
reduction or elimination of ice jams would be of considerably
more significance.
Summary of Hydrologic Impacts
Tables 3a and 3b summarize the measures investigated
by tasks 1 through 6 and present a sample of hydrologic
impacts. These tables should be used with caution because the
impacts cannot be added and represent a theoretical range which

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY MEASURES
TASKS 1 THROUGH 6
MEASURE
TECHNICALLY













U9 to 603 ft.
+1.0 to +1.5
—0 67 to -1.02
-0.30 to —0.57
Storage


































































































































































































































1/ Estimated subsequent to Task 5 report.
 
  
SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY MEASUESS
















































































































































































































































































































































(3) due to p1ace
ment of an ice bo



















St. Clair — Detroit R.
TABLE 4b
SYSTEMIC SCENARIOS (CMS AND METRES)
Base Case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
 
159 0 0 0





























outlet outlet increase(1) increase (2)






due to the use of the Black Rock Lock (36 cms) and
CGIP lowering (84 cms)
due to the additional 104 cms increase by removing
selected obstructions
due to placement of an ice boom at the head of the
St. Clair River





SUMMARY OF SYSTEMIC IMPACTS (FEET)
AFTER YEARS INDICATED
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Zgyears 5 years 2 years 5 years 2 years 5 years
Lake Superior —0.3 -0.2 +1.3 +2.1 +1.3 +2.1
Lakes Mich—Huron —0.3 -O.7 —1.1 —1.3 -T.2 —T.5
Lake Erie -0.2 —0.4 —0.9 -1.1 —1.0 ~T.2
Lake Ontariol/ -o.4 —o.2 —i.3 -o.4 -1.0 —0.2
Note: Positive vaiues indicate Teveis raised and negative values indicate
ieveis Towered.
1/ Changes in Teveis shown for a1] Lakes except Ontario are essentiaiiy the
maximum change for that Lake.
The maximum changes on Ontario are:
Scenario 1: — 0.7 ft. (after 3 years)
Scenario 2: — 1.7 ft. (after 2 years)






























































































Scenario 1: — 21 cm (after 3 years)
Scenario 2: — 52 cm (after 2 years)






After the Task Force completed its primary work in October 1987, the Commission
initiated several supplemental investigations which are described below.
By letter of October 13, 1987 the Commission requested its International Niagara
Board of Control to conduct a ﬁeld test on the operation of the Chippawa-Grass Island Pool (CGIP)
Control Structure to evaluate the possible effect of the structure on Lake Erie water levels. A report
summarizing the results of the field test, conducted in December 1987, was submitted to the Com-
mission in May 1988. The report indicates that although some problems occurred during the test
period, considerable data was collected using the acoustic velocity meter (AVM) already in place in
the Niagara River for demonstration purposes. The Board concluded that the data collected in the
test were much more reliable than those of earlier tests. However, as with the tests conducted by the
Board in May 1974 and June 1987, the December 1987 test encountered a similar problem of
constantly changing water levels in eastern Lake Erie. These occurrences made it extremely difﬁcult
to measure the very small differences in Niagara River ﬂows that are theoretically possible by
changing Pool levels. The Board’s analysis of the data did not identify any measurable effect on
Lake Erie outﬂows due to changes in the CGIP level. Accordingly, the Board recommended that no
further tests be carried out in the CGIP and upper Niagara River until better proven technologies in
ﬂow measurement exist.
By letter of October 13, 1987 the Commission requested the US. Army Corps of
Engineers to test the Corps’ Black Rock Lock at Buffalo, New York. Water was to be discharged
through the lock by opening butterﬂy valves in the lock miter gates and simultaneously opening the
lock ﬁlling and emptying systems. This combination was previously tested in 1987 for about 24
hours. However, the further test of one month was required to determine whether the lock could be
operated for a longer period of time, and also to receive advice on maximizing availability of such
operations with regard to winter conditions, maintenance or other limiting factors. The test was
initiated in July and completed in August, 1988 with no reported adverse effects.
Further review and consultation regarding the Long Lac and Ogoki Diversions
indicate that potential adverse effects on environmental and certain economic and recreational
interests as indicated under Task 3 and the Task Force Summary may be overstated.
As the Task Force was completing its work, it was suggested that the Black Rock
Lock could be modiﬁed quickly to achieve a design outﬂow capacity of about 12,000 to 15,000 cfs
(340 to 425 cms). Although further investigation of this concept is being undertaken as part of the
Commission’s comprehensive study, results to date indicate that incremental control of ﬂows
through the lock could be achieved by a set of stackable, steel stoplogs installed and removed as
necessary by a permanent stiff-legged derrick at a ﬁrst cost of about $3.5 million (1988 US. dollars)
with a maximum design ﬂow of 15,000 cfs (425 cms). Further investigation is underway regarding
navigation requirements and potential enviromnental impacts. However, recent maintenance investi—
gations have revealed signiﬁcant voids behind the lock walls. Consequently, the lock cannot be
considered structurally sufﬁcient for these large ﬂows until after rehabilitation is completed in 1989.
The Task Force investigated several contraints that limit outﬂows from Lake Ontario.
One of these is the threat of ﬂooding of agricultural lands immediately adjacent to Lake St. Peter in
Quebec during the growing season. Recently, the Commission has been informed that private
conservation organizations, land owners andthe Provincial Government have entered into negotia-
tions with a view to purchasing some ﬂood-prone land for duck habitat and protecting other land by
dyking. It is expected that the outcome of these negotiations will be important and could affect the
regulation of Lake Ontario, particularly during high water conditions. The Commission along with
with its International St. Lawrence River Board of Control will be monitoring developments as part
of its ongoing responsibilities under our Orders of Approval.
  
  
The Task Force estimated that the theoretical maximum ﬂow through the Welland
Canal is 11,000 cfs (31 l cms) with maximum water use by all sectors. However, at any flow sub—
stantially in excess of approximately 9,000 cfs (255 cms), there is a risk of erosion and bank slump-
ing in the canal itself. Further discussions with St. Lawrence Seaway ofﬁcials indicated that the
maximum allowable ﬂow may be 10,000 cfs (283 cms).
The Task Force inventoried readily available damage estimates due to high lake levels
during 1985-1987, and estimated some damages if levels increase beyond those experienced previ-
ously. Subsequent to the Task Force completing its work on this matter, the following reports were
released which provided additional shore-damage related information for Lake Superior:
( 1) Environment Canada
“Lake Superior Canadian Commercial and Industrial Shore Property Survey”; Christian
Stewart, Burlington, Ontario, February 1988;
52 pp.
(2) Ontari Min' ofN ur Re urean Envir 11
“Report on Lake Superior Shore Property Damage Economic Evaluation and Social Impact
Assessment”; Marshall, Macklin, Monaghan Limited; Don Mills, Ontario, 1988.
(3) Wi inDe n A " tin
“Govemor’s Task Force on High Great Lakes Water Levels Final Report”; December 1987,
17 pp.
Finally, the Task Force evaluated the systemic effects of various combinations of
emergency measures. Further computations, using a different combination of measures than those
originally selected by the Task Force, were undertaken. Table 3 summarizes the maximum impacts






After Years Indicated _1/
 
























Positive values indicate levels raised and negative values
indicate levels lowered.
y
This additional scenario assumed the same supplies and time period as Task 8 in the Task
Force investigation. The speciﬁc combination of measures is:








800 cfs (23 cms)
10,000 cfs (283 cms)
10,000 cfs (283 cms)
1,300 cfs (36 cms)
Emergency discretion to
602.3 feet (183.6 m)
 
